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Making Sense of the Sense of Justice
MARKUS DIRK DUBBERt
INTRODUCTION

This paper tries to shed light on an overused, yet
understudied, concept in modern legal and political
discourse: the sense of justice.1 Courts cite it,2 scholars5
invoke it 3 and measure it, 4 presidential candidates prize it,
and eulogists praise it.6
t Professor of Law & Director, Buffalo Criminal Law Center, SUNY Buffalo
School of Law; <dubber@buffalo.edu>. For helpful comments and suggestions
over the many years during which this project took shape, I owe thanks to
Guyora Binder, Simone Chambers, Sherman Clark, Sophie Dubber, Antony
Duff, Phoebe Ellsworth, William Ewald, Sara Faherty, Lindsay Farmer, Alan
Freeman, Klaus Giinther, Tatjana Hornle, Michael Hoffheimer, Elizabeth
Mensch, Wolfgang Naucke, Margaret Radin, James Q. Whitman, and Leonardo
Zaibert. I am also grateful to the Alexander-von-Humboldt Foundation for a
Research Fellowship in 2000-2001, and to Bernd Schilnemann of the Institute
for Legal Philosophy (University of Munich) for his hospitality during that time.
For a more in-depth discussion of the ideas in this paper, see MARKUS DIRK
DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT (forthcoming
2006).
1. See, e.g., State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1181 (N.J. 1994) ("[L]aw in
the last analysis must reflect the general community sense of justice." (quoting
Frances B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 70 (1933)).
2. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (earlier decision barring admission of victim impact evidence at
capital sentencing hearing "conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough
that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victims' rights' movement").
3. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARv. L. REV. 26, 54 (2000) (calling for constitutional interpretation that
"quests after the American People's particular sense of justice as embodied in
the unfolding words, deeds, and spirit of the Constitution and its
Amendments.").
4. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND
BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, at xv (1995) (charting

community's sense of justice regarding criminal law doctrines).
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But what is it? What do people mean when they refer to
the sense of justice? The answer is, of course, that they
mean a great many things, and sometimes they mean not
much at all. All too often, the sense of justice appears
roughly to have the significance of an exclamation point;
the preferred resolution of a given justice dispute is
justified as not only right and proper, but so much so that
any other resolution would "shock" the sense of justice.
Alternatively, one might dismiss the sense of justice as
simply beside the point, an irrational emotional impulse
dangerously out of place in a system of abstract legal and
political norms equally applied. Finally, in its communal
variant, the sense of justice might function as little more
than a stand-in for more obviously vacuous' ' 7 notions such as
"common sense" or "community sentiment.

5. See, e.g., Interview by the National Press Club with Ralph Nader,
presidential candidate, on Nat'l Public Radio (Jul. 23, 2000) (stating Supreme
Court nominees should have a "sense of justice, which is essential in order to
have a proper sense of when there's injustice").
6. See, e.g., Richard W. Benka, Remembrances of William 0. Douglas on the
50th Anniversary of his Appointment to the Supreme Court, in SUPREME COURT
HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1990 YEARBOOK (1990) (Douglas's "decisions were
profoundly governed by his sense of justice").
7. Celebrations of the communal sense of justice are particularly common in
discussions of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1181 (N.J.
1994) ("[T]he jury in a criminal prosecution serves as the conscience of the
community and the embodiment of the common sense and feelings reflective of
society as a whole."); United States v. Arnett, 342 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Mass.
1970) (stressing the "nexus between a juror and the community whose sense of
justice the jury as a whole is expected to reflect" (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-891, at
22 (1967))). For an admittedly random sample of some of the more commonly
cited communal senses of justice, beginning with the least specific one, "ours,"
see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 522 (1995) ("community's sense of justice")
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("public sense of justice"); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New
York, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) ("our sense of justice"); Jennifer S. Geetter,
Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to Transform the
American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 72-73 (2002) ("our
sense of justice"); Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary
Legal Philosopher,2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 489, 513 (2000) ("universal sense of
justice"); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 TEx. L. REV. 488, 512 (1976) ("people's sense of justice");
Judith Welch Wegner, Imagining the World Anew: The Course in State and
Local Government Law and the Future of Legal Education, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 741, 757 (2000) ("civic sense of justice"). Nazi ideology surely made the
most pernicious use of the notion of a communal sense of justice, the gesunde
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There is more to the sense of justice, however, or so I
shall argue in this paper. To assemble a serviceable account
of the sense of justice requires leaving the comfortable
confines of American jurisprudence, which has contributed
precious little to this subject, with one notable exception:
Edmond Cahn's The Sense of Injustice.s Cahn described the
sense of justice as a type of "empathy or imaginative
interchange," through which each member of a 9 group
"projects himself into the shoes of the other." This
definition, I think, is eminently sensible, as far as it goes.
Unfortunately, Cahn's interest in the sense of justice did
not go so far as to explain how this phenomenon arises and,
assuming we understand how the sense of justice works,
why it should matter in legal and political discourse.
Luckily, the sense of justice has received sustained
attention in several of the law's sister disciplines. Moral
psychology, for one, has explored notions of moral sentiment
and empathy for centuries. Political theory, too, deserves
our attention, mainly because John Rawls, the most
influential political philosopher of our time, assigned the
sense of justice a pivotal, though generally underappreciated, role in his theory of justice. Even linguistics
will get a closer look because of the intriguing parallels
between a sense of justice and a sense of language, and of
moral and linguistic competence.
In the end, I think, we will find that the sense of justice,
properly understood, does have a place in the way we talkand argue-about matters of justice. In fact, understood as
a general moral competence that consists of a bundle of
affective and cognitive capacities, the sense of justice is the
glue that holds communities of justice together in a modern
world void of substantive commonalities.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I locates the
sense of justice within a rich literature on sympathy and
Volksempfinden. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical
Volk: From Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMp. L. 227 (1995).
8. EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949). Other legal systems
have been somewhat less delinquent. See, e.g., MICHAEL BIHLER, RECHTSGEFOHL,
SYSTEM UND WERTUNG: EIN BEITRAG ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG
(1979); ERWIN RIEZLER, DAS RECHTSGEFUHL: RECHTSPSYCHOLOGISCHE BETRACHTUNGEN

(1921).
9. CAHN, supra note 8, at 24 (emphasis omitted).
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moral sense that includes not only contributions by the
classics of moral psychology (Hutcheson, Hume, Adam
Smith, Rousseau), but also by some scholars who are
generally associated with a radically different, rigidly
rationalistic, view of human judgment (most notably Kant
and Hegel). If Part I seeks to answer the question of what
makes the sense of justice a "sense," Part II considers what
makes it a sense of "justice." Part I defends the sense of
justice against crude charges of arbitrary emotionalism;
Part II highlights the function the sense of justice plays in
Rawls's and Habermas's theories of justice. Both Rawls and
Habermas regard the sense of justice as a normative
competence,
the
widespread-if
not
universaldevelopment of which is necessary for the establishment
and stability of political communities. Part III then explores
how the so-called linguistic analogy between justice and
language might inform an account of normative competence
that supplements traditional liberal accounts of autonomous agents by incorporating the sense of justice as a basic
capacity for empathy as mutual roletaking.
I. FROM PITY TO RESPECT

At the outset, it helps to remind ourselves that
attempts to make sense of the sense of justice aren't exactly
new. They belong to a long and distinguished tradition of
inquiry that reaches back at least to the Scottish
Enlightenment, though we might well trace this project
back yet further in time-as Martha Nussbaum has done in
her study of what she calls "the ancient pity tradition."'10
The work of Adam Smith is as good a place to start as
any. Smith argued that society is held together by mutual
bonds of sympathy and a general sense of justice."
According to Smith, the sense of justice is the voice of the

10. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND

PUBLIC LIFE 66 (1995)

[hereinafter POETIC JUSTICE]; see also MARTHA C.

NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 297-441
(2001) [hereinafter UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT].

11. See, e.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 308
(London, A. Millar 1759) ("Our sensibility to the feelings of others ... is the
very principle upon which that manhood is founded."); see also Martha C.
Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993).
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impartial spectator: "this great inmate,"12 "the ideal man
within the breast,"'13 "reason, principle, conscience, the
inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge
and arbiter of our conduct.., who, whenever we are about
to act so as to affect the happiness of others, calls to us,
with a voice capable of astonishing the most presumptuous
of our passions, that we are but one of the multitude, in no
respect better than any other in it."14 The sense of justice is
not only shared by all humans, or at least by all "commonly
honest" humans, but also quite powerful:
There is no commonly honest man who ... does not inwardly feel
the truth of that great stoical maxim, that for one man to deprive
another unjustly of any thing, or unjustly to promote his own
advantage by the loss or disadvantage of another, is more contrary
to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain, than all the
misfortunes which can 15affect him, either in his body, or in his
external circumstances.

To Smith, this universal and fundamental sense of
justice makes good evolutionary sense because it permitted
the maintenance of human communities. Maintaining
human communities in turn was crucial because of man's
fundamentally social nature. Given this vaguely sociobiological account of the role of the sense of justice, Smith
showed little interest in the definition of the objects of our
sense of justice: he did not develop a theory of moral
personhood. According to Smith, the sense of justice reflects
nothing other than "the general fellow-feeling which we
have with every man merely because he is our fellowcreature."' 6 This view of the origin of the sense of justice
may explain much altruistic behavior, particularly among
family members, but it remains to be seen whether it can
help us understand the phenomenon of a sense of justice.
Smith's thoughts on the operation of the sense of justice
are more useful for our purposes than his ideas regarding

12. 1 SMITH, supra note 11, at 296.

13. Id. at 301.
14. Id. at 277.
15. Id. at 279-80.
16. Id. at 184.
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its origin. He emphasizes the need to imaginatively identify
with the object of one's judgment. "By the imagination we
place ourselves in his situation, we can conceive ourselves
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his
body, and become in some measure the same person
with
17
him, and thence form some idea of his sensations."
Much has been made of the question whether this
imaginative identification maintains the distinction
between self and other. 18 I'm not sure how much turns on
the answer for our purposes, but it seems that a fusion
between self and other, either by eradicating the other
through incorporation into the self--or vice versa-would
describe a psychopathological symptom, rather than a
process of moral judgment. 19 At any rate, empathy and
sympathy couldn't be distinguished if we couldn't take
another's position without becoming her. 20 Similarly, it
would be difficult to explain the fact that sadists and
confidence men appear to possess remarkable empathic
abilities, without however collapsing the distinction
between ego and id.2 1 Without that distinction, they would
be psychotic; with that distinction, they are committing a
crime against another person.
Where Smith stood on this issue isn't clear. His
construct of an impartial spectator that represents the
moral view suggests that even if he did believe that
observer and object become one in the observer's imagination, the observer wasn't making the moral judgment in
this state. That judgment was possible only once he
assumed the perspective of the impartial spectator, from
where he could imaginatively identify with any number of
17. Id. at 9.
18. See Martin L. Hoffman, Toward a Theory of Empathic Arousal and
Development, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFFECT 227, 242 (Michael Lewis &
Leonard A. Rosenblum eds., 1978).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 507,
509 (Am~lie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (identity confusion).
20. On
the
distinction
between
the
capacity
for
empathy
(Einfiihlungsvermgen) and actual sympathy (Mitgeffihl-'Teeling with")-and
pity (Mitleid-"suffering with"), see SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (James Strachey trans., Boni & Liveright 1922)
(1921).

21. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 19, at 511.
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persons, switching back and forth between their viewpoints,
presumably without leaving too much of himself behind in
the process.
Smith's judicious spectator (figuratively) personifies a
feature of moral judgment that Smith's fellow Scotsman
David Hume also recognized as crucial, and at about the
same time: the reciprocal equality of judge and judged. As
Annette Baier puts it, to Hume "[t]he moral agent occupies
both the position of judge and of judged," and "the capacity
of any to adopt the moral point of view, to be moral judges,
depends upon their own willingness to be subject to
correction. ' 22 In Hume's own words, it's the "great
resemblance among all human creatures" that "must very
of
much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments
23
others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure.
But what is the identity that would enable one person
imaginatively to cross the gap separating herself from
24
another, and to see things from the other's point of view?
Nussbaum has traced one answer to this question, common
vulnerability, in her study of the emotion of pity. Following
Aristotle, she takes one of the cognitive elements of pity to
consist of the belief that the pitier's possibilities are similar
to those of the sufferer. 25 The feeling that "there but for the
grace of God, go I" or, slightly more cheerfully, that in
Rousseau's words "[e]ach may be tomorrow what the one
whom he helps is today,"26 is what accounts for our ability
to imagine ourselves as another: we're all the same in our
vulnerability to suffering, and more specifically "our
common vulnerability to pain. ' 27 (One dramatic variant of

22. Annette Baier, Master Passions,in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS, supra note 19,
at 403, 420-21.
23. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 318 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,

Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1739); see also id. at 322, 359, 608.
24. On identity as a precondition for identification, see FREUD, supra note
20.
25. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 65; see also NUSSBAUM,
UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 316 (discussing compassion).
26. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 224 (Allan Bloom

trans., Basic Books 1979).
27. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 319.
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this general point is the claim, also advanced
by Rousseau,
28
that we all share the inevitability of death.)
This won't do for a moral point of view, however, foras Nussbaum points out-we can be pretty sure that we
will be immune from certain kinds of suffering. Ordinarily,
white people in the United States won't suffer from racism,
heterosexual men won't suffer from sexual harassment, rich
white people won't get harassed by the police, and so on.
But what's more, the moral point of view doesn't seem to
depend on possibility estimates of this kind. From the
moral standpoint, it shouldn't matter how likely it is that
this or that will happen to me. The whole point of morality,
as opposed to prudence, is supposed to be that these
considerations don't come into play. 29 Perhaps pity has
something to do with this sort of calculus; in that event,
however, pity wouldn't qualify as a moral sentiment, like
the sense of justice, but would be better thought of as an
ethical sensation triggered by the observation of someone
pitiable or even pitiful, i.e., someone in a decidedly inferior
position vis-A-vis ourselves, someone incapable of helping
0
herself.3
We do seem to have a different emotional attitude
toward objects capable of experiencing pain than toward
those that are not. If the object of our judgment can't feel
pain itself, we can't feel its pain in her stead, we can't feel
for it. That may be why we react differently toward the
sight of a tree being chopped down than we do toward a dog
being run over by a car.
Yet it's quite another thing to claim that the capacity
for pain by itself makes someone, or something, the object of
moral emotions. It may well be that "vulnerability makes us

28. ROUSSEAU, supra note 26.
29. This is one of the ideas behind Rawls's original position which, through
a veil of ignorance, attempts to model the abstract moral point of view. Rawls
renders probability considerations of this sort irrelevant indirectly, not by
declaring them so, but by making them impossible due to the ignorance of the
deliberator.
30. See Blum, supra note 19, at 512 (contrasting pity with compassion).
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proper objects of sympathy and caring,"'31 or pity. But it
doesn't make us proper objects of empathy, or moral
sentiments. We may feel a dog's pain, but we can't
empathize with it in a moral sense because it lacks the
capacities requisite for moral personhood.
There is a sophisticated version of the common
vulnerability thesis that attempts to isolate a specifically
human vulnerability. What we share with objects of moral
sentiments thus wouldn't merely be the common vulnerability to pain, but the common human vulnerability to pain.
So, rather than share the inevitability of death, we might
share the consciousness of that inevitability. And rather
than share a common vulnerability to pain, and the
consciousness thereof, we might regard ourselves as
sharing vulnerability to a pain specific to us as persons.
Drawing on Schopenhauer's work, Habermas appears to
hold this view. He argues that the human subject is
uniquely, and constitutionally, vulnerable because she can
only become a person, i.e., develop a personal identity, by
relations. She can create
exposing herself to interpersonal
32
herself only through others.
But this version of the common vulnerability thesis is a
far cry from the claim that the moral community includes
everyone (and everything) subject to what Habermas33 calls
"cruder threats to the integrity of life and limb." The
difference is that the notion of a "chronic fragility of
personal identity" 34 presumes an account of personhood. It's
that account which holds the key to the problem of the
identity which gives rise to moral empathy. As we'll see,
what matters in the end is the commonality of personhood
itself, rather than its common vulnerability.

31. John Sabini & Maury Silver, Emotions, Responsibility,and Character,in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 165, 170 (Ferdinand Schoeman
ed., 1987).
32. See JURGEN HABERMAS, Morality and the Ethical Life: Does Hegel's
Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 195, 199-200 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber

Nicholsen trans., 1990).
33. Id. at 199.
34. Id.
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To understand the sense of justice and its identificatory
basis as a moral sentiment-a sentiment of justice-we
need to move beyond the Scottish Enlightenment and take
a look at the German Enlightenment, in particular the
work of Kant and Hegel. Kant and Hegel's relationship to
the Scottish moral sense school, and their thought on the
role of moral sentiment, has been unjustly neglected. The
usual story about Kant paints a simple picture: Kant was
an adherent of the moral sense school until his Copernican
turn, after which he categorically rejected the positions of
that school. The line on Hegel's relation to moral sense
philosophy is similarly straightforward: He was the
ultimate philosopher of objective reason who not only
thought the notion of an innate moral (or religious) sense
ludicrous, 35 but also fought the emotionalists and sentimentalists of his time tooth and nail.36
While both of these stories certainly bear more than a
grain of truth, they fail to account for a significant element
in Kant's moral theory and misinterpret Hegel's appropriation of that theory in his own philosophy of right. When
all is said and done, Kant's moral theory turns on the
concept of what he called the "peculiar" non-sensuous moral
sense (Moralgef/ihl), which explains every human and,
more generally, every non-perfectly rational being's
heartfelt concern for and knowledge of the categorical
imperative (not to treat another merely as a means), the
central principle of morality. Kant's moral sense manifests
our respect for the moral law and is evoked whenever we
recognize that we, or someone
else, act according to, and are
37
motivated by, its dictates.
35. See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of
Crime and Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1593-97 (1994) (discussing

Hegel's critiques of F.H. Jacobi and Schleiermacher).
36. For his assault on Jacob Fries, see the Preface to GEORG WILHELM
FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) [hereinafter
ELEMENTS]. See also Dubber, supranote 35, at 1593-96.
37. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 59
(Ak. 460) (James W. Ellington trans., Hacket 1981) (1785) [hereinafter KANT,
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS]; IMMANUEL KANT, KRITIK DER PRAKTISCHEN VERNUNFT

46, 86-95 (Ak. 38, 73-81) (Karl Vorlinder ed., Felix Meiner Verlag 9th ed. 1985)
(1788) [hereinafter KANT, ZWEITE KRITIK]; IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER

SITTEN 530-31 (A35-37) (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., Suhrkamp 8th ed. 1982)
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Upon closer inspection, Kant's harshest polemics are
not directed at those who assign emotion a place in moral
theory. Kant's criticism focuses on those who, like Smith's
teacher Francis Hutcheson, portrayed the moral sense as a
unique perceptive faculty. 38 By the end of the eighteenth
century, however, Scottish moral sense philosophy itselfHutcheson's
and Smith in particular-had come to reject
39
peculiar version of the peculiar moral sense.
But Kant was far from denying sentiment a role in the
moral point of view, however firmly he came to reject the
idea that it, as a specific capacity, alone could bear the
weight of moral theory as a whole. Today, Kant's moral
theory is associated most closely with the notion that
persons deserve respect as persons, that personhood confers
a common dignity that stems from a universal capacity for
self-government, or autonomy. One can regard Kant's moral
thought as a continuous attempt to work out the foundations and the meaning of this respect owed all persons as
such.
Kantian respect, however, is also a moral sentiment.
Already in his early work, Kant recognized that, in J.B.
Schneewind's words, "moral principles are . . . but the
40
awareness of the feeling of the dignity of human nature."
The problem was that this feeling alone, without a proper

(1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSIK]. Every moral being possesses this
Moralgefuhl, which should be cultivated and strengthened. KANT, ZWEITE
KRITIK, supra at 46 (Ak. 38); KANT, METAPHYSIK, supra at 530-31 (A36). See
generally A.M. MacBeath, Kant on Moral Feeling, 64 KANT-STUDIEN 283 (1973);
HENRI LAUENER, HUME UND KANT: SYSTEMATISCHE GEGENUBERSTELLUNG EINIGER

HAUPTPUNKTE IHRER LEHREN 152-59, 196-205 (Francke Verlag Bern & Munich
1969).
38. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 37, at 46 n.30, 59; KANT,
ZWEITE KRITIK, supra note 37, at 45-46; KANT, METAPHYSIK, supra note 37, at

530-31. This also applies to Hegel's comments on emotion and morality in the
Philosophy of Right. See Dubber, supra note 35, at 1596. On Hutcheson, see
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF THE PASSIONS
AND AFFECTIONS WITH ILLUSTRATIONS ON THE MORAL SENSE (London, J. Osborn &
T. Longman 1728). See also W. L. TAYLOR, FRANCIS HUTCHESON AND DAVID HUME
AS PREDECESSORS OF ADAM SMITH (1965).

39. 2 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 293-305 (London, A.
Millar 1759).
40. J.B. SCHNEEWND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 502 (1998).
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understanding of its origin and operation, was neither
universal nor sturdy enough to ground moral action. It's a
feeling of intra-communal identification that's strongest
among family members but weakens as its circle of
identification, or of sympathy, expands, eventually to
encompass all moral persons. "[A]s soon as this feeling has
risen to its proper universality, it has become sublime, but
also colder." 41 This is a familiar problem for theories of
interpersonal obligation that deny the need to abstract from
substantive communities at some point, and are forced to
stress the familial aspects of even the largest and most
to
anonymous
political
community.
"Benevolence
strangers,"
as
Hume
recognized,
"is
too
weak
for
this
42
purpose."

Kant saw the beginnings of a solution to this problem in
the work of Rousseau:
I feel the whole thirst for knowledge and the curious unrest to get
further on, or also the satisfaction in every acquisition. There was
a time when I believed that this along could make the honor of
humanity and I despised the rabble that knows nothing. Rousseau
set me to rights. This dazzling superiority vanishes, I learn to
honor man .... 43

Rousseau not only spoke of the respect that is due all
persons as such, but he also hinted at what it was about
persons that entitled them to this respect: the capacity for
autonomy. Kant's theory of autonomy, and therefore his
entire moral theory, is an account of the feeling of respect
for all persons. In the end, Kant integrated his insight into
the significance of the moral sentiment, namely the respect
due all moral persons as such, with a theory of the moral
standpoint that abstracted from particular substantive
characteristics of the person. He thereby placed morality on
a universal footing not subject to the vagaries of benevolence, a feeling neither universal nor deeply enough felt. In
this way, he could extend moral obligation even to someone

41. IMMANUEL KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELINGS OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND
SUBLIME 58 (John T. Goldthwait trans., 1991); SCHNEEWIND, supra note 40, at

502; see also HUME, supra note 23, at 481-83.
42. HUME, supranote 23, at 491.

43.

SCHNEEWIND,

supra note 40, at 489.
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who didn't feel benevolence toward outsiders; whether she
did or didn't feel benevolent was irrelevant, what mattered
was that she was bound to identify with a fellow person
because they both shared the universal capacity for selfgovernment, the capacity which gave them moral status in
that, on the one hand, they could decide on a conception of a
good and, on the other, could pursue that conception, and be
responsible for their actions in that pursuit.
The moral sentiment of respect for other persons as
moral agents therefore is not a simple sentiment of
benevolence. It is a mediated sentiment, mediated through
the recognition of a capacity for self-government, which
finds expression in the categorical imperative. Respect for
the moral law-Kant's Moralgefihl, the sense of the
moral-therefore ultimately is respect for the moral persons
whose autonomy it manifests and protects. And the sense of
the just is simply the analogue to the sense of the moral in
the context of political, rather than moral, theory.
Hegel too can be seen as clarifying the moral
significance of that point of identification which gives rise to
the sense of justice as a mediated form of empathy. Hegel
didn't have much to say about the sense of justice (or
Rechtsgefiihl) in particular. He did draw a useful
distinction, however, between Gef/ihl and Empfindung
(sensation) by contrasting the subjectivity of Empfindung
with the potential objectivity of Gefiihl.44 He also pointed
of a sense, rather than a sensation, of
out that we speak
45
justice or of self.
Now, Hegel saw that a person evaluating an offender's
moral desert or contemplating fundamental questions about
the institutions of justice and their effect on herself and
others cannot see herself in another's particular characteristics without first recognizing that she already shares at
least one basic characteristic with that person. It is the
acknowledgment of this identity, however formal, that
permits the onlooker to engage in the sort of empathic

44. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ENZYKLOPADIE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN
WISSENSCHAFTEN §§ 399-412 (1830) [hereinafter ENZYKLOPADIE]; see also HEGEL,
ELEMENTS, supra note 36, at 35-37.
45. See HEGEL, ENZYKLOPADIE, supra note 44, § 402 (Rechts- or Selbstgefiihl,

instead of Rechts- or Selbstempfindung).
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thought experiment that is required for a full assessment of
desert 46
or a considered judgment on issues of institutional
justice.
That basic characteristic, that point of identification,
was their shared personhood. This most abstract equality
remains as the background condition governing all
interactions between individuals in modern society. 47 No
matter what other identities they acquire, as members of
families or of other substantive communities, they will
always remain identical in their personhood. 48 And,
according to Hegel, it's that personhood that marks them as
bearers of rights, as legal subjects entitled to claim right,
and to be punished for violations thereof.
Law is a relation of people considered as persons. Its
general norm is "be a person and respect others as
persons." 49 To be a person, however, is to manifest one's
capacity for autonomy. 50 To respect another person as such
is to respect her as someone endowed with that capacity.
This becomes clearest in Hegel's discussion of crime and
punishment. There he explains that the essence of crime is
one person (the offender) treating another as a non-person
(the victim), while punishment treats the offender
as a
51
person by holding him responsible for his actions.
Hegel's analysis of the significance of abstract identification doesn't add much to Kant's account. He does make
46. Cf. SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO

(James Strachey trans., 1922) (1921) (holding identity as precondition for
identification).
47. This baseline identity is the subject of the first part of his Philosophy of
Right, Abstract Right.
48. See ELEMENTS, supra note 36, at 189-380 (includes the third portion of
the book, Ethical Life, which discusses these other aspects of personal
existence).
49. See id. at 69.
50. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES
RECHTS ODER NATURRECHT UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFr Im GRUNDRISSE Z35

(Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 1986); id. at 89 (Hegel's Bemerkung zu § 33) (1986)
("I have Right because I am free.").
51. Id. at 182 (Hegel's Bemerkung zu § 95) (1986). See generally Dubber,
supra note 35, at 1577. In this sense, the offender can be said to have a right to
be punished. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy
and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113 (1998).
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clear, however, that although this identification is
necessary, it cannot be sufficient in an actual political
community. The difference between morality and politics is
that morality can lay the foundation for, and set the
minimum standards of, legitimacy. But morality cannot
pretend to capture political life in its full complexity.
Without acknowledging the intricate interplay between
memberships and commitments,
various communal
between different identities, the role of the status of moral
personhood in fact may be obscured. For it's precisely
because these substantive attachments are so strong, and
at times so confusing, if not conflicting, that taking the
moral point of view--or the point of view of justice-is so
crucial. The theory of justice thus does no more than work
out the place for this moral point of view, from which all
persons are considered as such, in a complex society of
multiple communities. And the commitment to justice is
nothing more than the commitment to always also-not
always only-regard everyone as a person, no matter what
else she might be or try to be.
Kant's (and therefore also Hegel's) relation to Rousseau
on the nature of the identification, or "resemblance," for
purposes of the sense of justice is difficult to nail down,
partly due to Rousseau's inconsistent statements on this
topic, which varied from context to context, and medium to
a
medium. In Emile, for instance, Rousseau used 52
Bildungsroman to explore problems of moral education.
And it's there that we find his most extensive treatment of
the sense of justice. He lays out a process of moral
development that prefigures much of what Piaget was to
document much later. From self-recognition, and the
development of a sense of justice with respect to oneself, he
and then imaginative
moves to other-recognition,
roletaking, through which the recognition of the sense of
justice of another, and therefore mutual roletaking and the
sense of justice properly speaking, becomes possible.
But in Emile, Rousseau isn't very specific about the
nature of the identity between self and other-and Emile
and the gardener in particular-which makes the allimportant roletaking possible. As we saw earlier, he speaks

52. See RouSsEAU, supra note 26.
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loosely of the inevitability of death as the sign of our
common humanity.5 3 To point out to Emile that he too
might, through some cruel blow of fate, be reduced to
gardenerdom may be an effective pedagogical device, but it
doesn't make for a sound foundation for a moral theory, nor
was it designed to make for one.
In the Social Contract, Rousseau had more to say about
personhood and the capacity for autonomy. 54 But there,
unlike in Emile, he was primarily concerned with political
legitimacy, i.e., the question of how to construct a form of
government consistent with this capacity. It was left to
Kant to develop a moral theory based on the idea that
freedom meant self-government, so that to be free means
not to be free of rules, but to be governed by rules one gives
to oneself. Moreover, whether Rousseau's notion of the allwith the
powerful general will is, in the end, compatible
55
idea of autonomy is at least an open question.
It was Kant who recognized the crucial importance of
the connection between the sense of justice and the moral
capacity of persons as such. I may well recognize another
person (Kant's shoemaker, Rousseau's gardener) as
sufficiently like me to imaginatively engage in mutual
roletaking with her. But then again, I may not. And if I do
not, I haven't shown myself to lack a sense of justice, but
merely a sense of intraspecies solidarity. I would lack a
sense of justice only if I failed to perceive the other person
as a fellow person, endowed with the same capacity for
autonomy that I possess. From a sociological-and maybe a
pedagogical-point of view, it doesn't matter which
characteristic ends up triggering my identification with
another. From the moral point of view, it does. The sense of
justice is only a moral sentiment, or a sentiment of justice,
if it attaches to persons as moral agents.
Since the days of the Scottish and German
Enlightenment, the moral significance of the identification
53. See id. at 222.
54. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (Christopher Betts trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994).

55. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and
Democracy, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS 143-63 (Christopher W. Morris
ed., 1986).
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underlying empathy has not attracted much attention. But
the general explicatory role of identification has. The social
sciences, characteristically unconcerned with the normative
implications of their discoveries, have described various
processes of identification, based on various common
characteristics. Some writers have spoken of points of
identity that are at least not inconsistent with notions of
shared personhood. So Lawrence Blum has mentioned a
"shared humanity," and the recognition that observed
suffering was "the kind of thing that could happen to
anyone, including oneself insofar as one is a human
being. ' 56 But it generally remains unclear, and unexplored,
what that might mean.
The exception is John Rawls. He is the first modern
moral philosopher to once again give serious thought to the
moral standing of the sense of justice. In fact, Rawls's work
on the sense of justice can be seen as an attempt to
elaborate on Kant's discovery that moral sentiment and
moral capacity, and autonomy in particular, were
connected. For Rawls, the sense of justice is the moral
sentiment par excellence, the capacity and the desire to
experience and act according to particular moral sentiments
toward others. 57 The sense of justice is the ability and the
willingness to take up the point of view of justice, which
means to regard others as equal and rational persons who
are capable of and entitled to autonomy.
Rawls's project of finding a role for the sense of justice
in legal and political theory has met with little interest, in
sharp contrast to other aspects of his work. 58 This is
unfortunate. Invocations of the sense of justice are a fact of
legal life in the United States and elsewhere. Beyond the
realm of legal doctrine and discourse, the sense of justice
can play an important role in an account of political life in
modern society, including the very existence of a system of
law that makes private harm its public business. Thinking
about the sense of justice can help us better understand
what Rawls calls the "basis of equality," or the concept of
56. Blum, supra note 19, at 511.
57. See John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 281 (1963).

58. What's more, Rawls himself appears to have abandoned it. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996).
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personhood, and particularly into those basic competences
that allow us to function and to interact with others in a
political community devoid of consensus about substantive
virtues. Here the study of the sense of justice connects up
with research into constitutive competence in other
disciplines, including developmental psychology and
linguistics, and the sense of language in particular. The
latter connection lies at the heart of discourse ethics in
particular, which very consciously sets out to identify
communicative competence as a presupposition of the
communicative process which, in the view of its adherents,
is the only source of legitimation in modern pluralistic
society.
II. MORAL AND COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE
The sense of justice plays a central role in the two most
ambitious political theories of our time, Rawls's justice as
fairness and Habermas's discourse ethics. What's more, it
plays a similar role in both Rawls's and Habermas's system.
This is perhaps not surprising, given that both pursue
similar projects: to develop a theory of the legitimacy of
political institutions in a pluralistic society. Without the aid
of religious or moral authority, however derived and
however constituted, they struggle to find some other,
formal, foundation for political legitimacy, or justice. In
Habermas's view,
[o]nly the rules and communicative presuppositions that make it
possible to distinguish an accord or agreement among free and
equals from a contingent or forced consensus have legitimating
communicative
rules
and
such
today.
Whether
force
presuppositions can best be interpreted and explained with the
help of natural law constructions and contract theories or in the
concepts of a transcendental philosophy or a pragmatics of
language or even in the framework of a theory of the development
of moral consciousness is secondary .... 59

The difference between Rawls and Habermas is that
Rawls pursued the first option ("natural law constructions

59. JURGEN HABERMAS, Legitimation Problems
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178,

in the Modern State, in
188 (1979).
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and contract theories") and Habermas the third ("a
pragmatics of language"). As we'll see, however, the two
converge in their common interest in the fourth-and their
rejection of the third ("transcendental philosophy"). Both
have tried to anchor their theories of legitimation in
research on developmental psychology, and the work of
Piaget and Kohlberg on moral competence in particular.
And both have stressed the analogy between their work and
that of Noam Chomsky, insofar as Chomsky is interested in
the nature and origin of linguistic competence, which may
or may not differ from that of moral competence.
The notion of competence, or capacity, plays a crucial
role in Rawls's and Habermas's search for formal
foundations. While Rawls focused more straightforwardly
on moral competence, Habermas sought to map out a more
general-and formal- "communicative competence." While
Rawls explored the preconditions for moral behavior, and
thus for just behavior since justice is the political
manifestation of morality, Habermas sought to specify the
preconditions of social interaction, and therefore communication, in general, without limiting himself to moral
discourse.
Rawls gave much thought to what he called the basis of
equality, i.e., "the features of human beings in virtue of
which they are to be treated in accordance with the
principles of justice. '60 By contrast, Habermas preferred to
focus on a more abstract "interactive competence," i.e.,
those capacities that allow a speaker to function in the sort
of discourse that defines public life, "the general
qualifications for role behavior that together form
interactive competence" 6 1 and "the ability of a speaker
to embed a well-formed
oriented to mutual understanding
sentence in relations to reality. '62
For our purposes most significant, Rawls and
Habermas agree that the requisite competence includes the
sense of justice. Rawls explains that to be entitled to equal
60. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 504 (1971).

61. JORGEN

HABERMAS,

Moral

Development

and

Ego

Identity,

in

COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 59, at 69, 86.

62. JURGEN HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?,in COMMUNICATION
AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supranote 59, at 1, 29.
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justice, all we need is "the capacity for moral personality. '63
Human beings are moral persons, i.e., they have the
capacity for moral personality, insofar as they share two
characteristics: "they are capable of having (and are
assumed to have) a conception of their good" and "they are
of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of
capable 64
justice."
The sense of justice in turn is defined as "a skill in
judging things to be just and unjust, and in supporting
these judgments by reasons" and "[a] desire to act in accord
with these pronouncements and expect a similar desire on
the part of others."65 In short, the sense of justice, which
refers to as a "moral capacity" 66 or
Rawls 'alternately
"power, 67 a "mental capacity ... involving the exercise of
70
thought, ' 68 and a "moral sentiment"69 or "sensibility," is
''an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of
71
justice and so from the point of view of justice."
That sense of justice, however, itself presupposes two
capacities, one cognitive, the other volitional. To be effective,
the sense of justice presupposes a certain skill, the ability to
identify and understand principles of justice well enough to
apply them to a particular case (the cognitive capacity
familiar from the insanity defense in criminal law 72 ). But
that's not enough. The person, once she has understood and
applied the principles properly, must be able to act

63. RAWLS, supranote 60, at 505.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 46.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 51.
70. Id. at 46.
71. Id. at 567.
72. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). It's no accident that
insanity in criminal law is often described as absence of a sense of justice. See
Janet A. Tighe, Francis Wharton and the Nineteenth-Century Insanity Defense:
The Origins of a Reform Tradition, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 223, 239 (1983) (moral

insanity).
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according to them (the volitional capacity 73). Add to these
capacities the willingness, or desire, to do so, and one has a
full-fledged sense of justice.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls stresses this last,
motivational, aspect of the sense of justice, as opposed to
the capacities that must be presupposed for its exercise.
(The criminal law, by contrast, focuses on the underlying
capacities.) It's this motivational component that assures
the stability of a set of principles of justice. Rawls argues
that it's not enough to have a set of principles of justice, and
to establish political institutions on their basis. Members of
such a "well-ordered society" also need to see their sense of
justice reflected in these institutions. If they see justice
being done, and justice being done to them in particular,
they are more likely to act according to their sense of
justice-and therefore comply with the rules of the wellordered society, which are presumptively just-rather than
in their personal interest. In such a society, the sense of
justice as a desire to act according to the principles of
justice simply74 becomes the "desire to comply with the
existing rules."
Ideally, the members of a well-ordered society
eventually come to realize that, in a society governed by the
principles of justice, their personal interest also is the
public interest, so that acting according to their sense of
justice is also to their personal advantage. In Rawls's
language, they see that their conceptions of the good and of
the just converge, that "being a good person ... is indeed a
good for that person." 75 But being good in such a wellordered society, "in which institutions are just and this fact
is publicly recognized," means "having an effective sense of
justice." 76
For our purposes, the role of the sense of justice in
guaranteeing stability is of only secondary importance.
Even Rawls acknowledges that stability is only a
supplemental factor that the parties in the original position

73. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
74. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 312.
75. Id. at 577.
76. Id.
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will consider in their deliberations about the basic design of
their political community, everything else being equal. 77
Still, the connection between the sense of justice and the
stability of a political order may provide some content to the
otherwise dangerously empty notion that "law in the last
analysis78 must reflect the general community sense of
justice."
Rawls's account of the convergence of the sense of
justice and individual conceptions of the good is his attempt
to address the problem of alienation, first identified by
Hegel. To Hegel the legitimacy and therefore the stability of
a political order depended on the extent to which it reflected
rationality, and in particular the rationality of its
constituents, and was seen by them to do so. Rawls takes
from Hegel the general idea of identification between
individual and state, but substitutes the concept of the
sense of justice for the more ambitious, and notoriously
nebulous, Hegelian notion of rationality, or Reason.
So in Rawls, the stability of the state is achieved by
ensuring that its constituents see themselves reflected in it,
not as fellow manifestations of Reason, but as moral
persons. They will obey the state's commands insofar as
they perceive the state as treating them as persons entitled
to equal justice. But Rawls ends up not all that far from
Hegel. For rationality, though understood more narrowly as
individual intellectual capacity,7 9 turns out to be among the
prerequisites for moral personhood.8 0
Rawls's account of the acquisition of the motivational
aspect of the sense of justice is straightforward. Essentially,
we develop a desire-as opposed to a capacity-to act justly,
i.e., from the standpoint of justice, because we've been
treated kindly in the past. We love our parents because
they love us, and treat us accordingly.81 We come to like, if
not love, our colleagues because they like us, and treat us

77. See id. at 455.
78. State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1181 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Frances B.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 70 (1933)).
79. See RAWLS, supra note 60, at 46.

80. See id. at 12.
81. Id. at 463.
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accordingly.8 2 And so it is with the sense of justice, properly
speaking: "We develop a desire to apply and to act upon the
principles of justice [i.e., a sense of justice] once we realize
how social arrangements answering to them have promoted
we are affiliated,"8 3
our good and that of those with whom
84
i.e., our family and our "associates."
Now this reciprocal account well may be accurate as a
matter of developmental psychology (though Rawls does not
much concern himself with garnering empirical support). I
may well be more likely to show kindness to strangers if
strangers have shown kindness toward me, or my own. But
whether this account has any normative significance is
another matter-and Rawls doesn't claim it has. It's a
supplementary speculation about why we might be inclined
to act according to our sense justice, rather than according
to our personal advantage. And it does that well enough.
More interesting is the question of why we develop a
sense of justice in the first place, not why we continue to act
on it. To acquire a sense of justice presumes that we are
capable of viewing and treating another person as a moral
person, i.e., as a person entitled to justice. We can't be
motivated to exercise a capacity we do not have.
One way of seeing the limited relevance of motivation,
or desire, for a theory of justice is to think about what
happens if someone possesses the intellectual capacity for a
sense of justice, but not the motivation to act on it. In other
words, let's consider the fact of crime, a phenomenon that
Rawls concedes exists even in a well-ordered society.
Without the possibility of crime in such a society governed
by the principles of justice, there would be no need for a
separate account of stability.
Now in an important sense a criminal offender, who by
hypothesis is a person with a motivational deficit, is clearly
entitled to equal justice. While he may lack a full-fledged
sense of justice, i.e., he may not have realized his capacity
for a sense of justice, he does have the requisite capacity.
And, as Rawls stresses repeatedly, the capacity is enough

82. Id. at 470.
83. Id. at 474.
84. Id. at 470.
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for moral personhood; its full realization isn't required. In
other words, we may "assume," for purposes of theorybuilding, that everyone who is capable of having a sense of
justice will also actually have acquired that sense, but that
assumption is not irrefutable. 85 In legal terms, there is a
rebuttable presumption that everyone with the capacity for
a sense of justice will in fact have a sense of justice.
Consider the insanity defense. It removes certain
individuals from the scope of retributive justice. It is
impossible to direct resentment-as a moral sentiment, or a
sentiment of justice-at an insane person because such a
person lacks the cognitive and volitional capacity required
for a sense of justice. She cannot understand the principles
of justice, nor can she apply them to her case or, even if she
can do both, she can't get herself to8 6act accordingly-at
least in modern versions of the defense.
If, by contrast, the absence of a motivation to act justly
even in the presence of the capacity to do so would remove a
person from the realm of resentment, or even indignation,
then every criminal offender by hypothesis would be beyond
punishment. For the very act of crime illustrates the lack of
motivation to act justly, assuming of course we're dealing
with crime in the proper sense, excluding so-called "police"
or "regulatory" offenses, which have nothing to do with
justice or injustice, and in this sense are ajust. Crime, by
contrast, is an act of injustice, in that87 it consists of one
person treating another as a nonperson.
Now the absence of motivation alone surely can't
remove a person from the community of retributive justice.
But perhaps the reason for this absence is relevant. Recall
that Rawls sees the development of this motivation as the
result of experiencing similarly motivated behavior directed
toward oneself-and others with whom one identifies-by
others. So I love my parents because they love me, like my
colleagues because they like me, and respect fellow persons
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1). Traditionally, criminal insanity
was limited to the absence of cognitive capacity. See M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
87. See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).

2005]

SENSE OF JUSTICE

839

because they respect me. This raises the obvious question of
what to do with individuals who failed to experience these
acts of kindness at all, or any, of these levels of ethical life.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that Rawls
postulates a cumulative and temporal order among familial
love, associational affection, and moral respect. The acquisition of one presumes the acquisition of the preceding
sentiment, so that moral respect presumes associational
affection which in turn presumes familial love. This means
that already the lack of parental love will block the
development of associational affection and therefore also of
the sense of justice later on. And the image of family life
that Rawls paints does not match the reality of the
childhood experiences of a good many criminal offenders, or
for that matter of many who end up leading perfectly lawabiding lives:
The parents ... love the child and in time the child comes to love
and to trust his parents .... The parents' love of the child is
expressed in their evident intention to care for him ....Their love
is displayed by their taking pleasure in his presence and
supporting his sense of competence and self-esteem. They
of growing up and they
encourage his efforts to master the tasks
88
welcome his assuming his own place.

The reason why someone's lack of motivation to act
justly might matter has nothing to do with the presence or
absence of a sense of justice. The question here is whether
this "defect or deprivation," as Rawls describes it,89 can be
attributed to that person, whether it is her "fault."90 But
even to assess her fault, as a moral concept, already is to
recognize her membership in the community of justice, in
this case the community of retributive justice. Fault, thus,
cannot be a relevant criterion for determining moral status.
Rather than focus on origins, we might consider
distinguishing between levels of desire, or motivation.
88. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 463-64. Rawls of course isn't trying to describe
actual child rearing practices. He is laying out the process of acquiring a sense
of justice in a well-ordered society, where the parents are well-intentioned and
the children well-behaved.
89. Id. at 506.
90. See Rawls, supra note 57, at 302.
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Perhaps we commit crimes not because we have no desire to
act justly, but because we have an insufficiently strong
desire, which can falter in the face of great temptation, i.e.,
of some opportunity to advance our personal interest at the
expense of another, and therefore of justice. (Would I snatch
your expensive laptop computer, for instance, if I could be
sure that I wouldn't get caught?)
Even if this makes sense in theory, and I'm not sure it
does since the only evidence of the level of person's moral
motivation might consist of its insufficiency as evidenced in
the criminal act, there remains the problem that as a
matter of fact we don't inquire into a person's desire to act
justly when it comes to deciding whether she is subject to
retributive justice. All that matters is that she could have
acted otherwise, not how much she would have wanted to.
Here it might be useful to distinguish the sense of
justice, a moral sentiment, from other senses of obligation,
or ethical sentiments. Many criminal offenders do identify
very strongly with fellow members of certain substantive
communities, including their family and extra-familial,
associations, like gangs or sports teams. These offenders, no
matter how devoted they might be to their own, need not
have developed a sense of justice. They obviously possess
the capacity for mutual identification required for any sense
of obligation toward another. If they operate within a gang,
rather than as lone wolves (as serial killers tend to do), they
also have shown some reflective capacity for identification
outside the biological, or quasi-biological, family unit. But
they need not have developed the specific ability to take the
moral point of view, and thus to see others as persons.
Instead, the lack of this ability may well account for their
tendency to see others exclusively in terms of their membership, or nonmembership, in a substantive community, such
as a gang. This attitude accounts for the ferocity of gang
warfare, for instance, but also of international, and even
more plainly of interethnic, conflict.
None of this is to say, by the way, that the rational
capacity for a sense of justice is sufficient for criminal
liability. It's sufficient merely for treatment as a moral
person, and therefore for the assessment of moral desert. It
is necessary for criminal liability (hence the insanity
defense), but not sufficient. For criminal liability, the
person must actually have acted on that capacity, i.e., she
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must have manifested her capacity for personhood in an
act. Sanity is required, but so is voluntariness and
culpability. Moral condemnation, by contrast, can attach to
thoughts alone.
So the absence of any or even a sufficiently strong
motivation to act justly does not remove a person from the
realm of retributivejustice. The mere capacity to act justly
is enough. Criminal punishment treats the offender with
the requisite rational capacity for a sense of justice as
though she also possessed the requisite motivational
capacity. It's "rehabilitative" in the sense that by treating
the offender as having a fully realized sense of justice, she
will in fact develop one, and act accordingly in the future. 91
Individuals with the rational capacity for a sense of
justice thus can still be punished, even if they lack the
motivational aspects of the sense of justice, "the capacity for
the natural attitudes of love and affection, faith and mutual
trust."92 This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the
''93
motivationally challenged remain "full subject[s] of rights
in other contexts of justice as well. As a matter of
distributive and of restorative justice (the flipside of
retributive justice), then, someone without the desire to act
justly is just as entitled to just treatment as anyone else.
The lack of desire to comply doesn't by itself disqualify
anyone from fair treatment in the distribution of goods.
Even if her disrespect for principles of justice has
manifested itself in criminal behavior, we may decide to
punish her, and therefore limit her exercise of certain
rights, but we do not remove her from the realm of justice
altogether, nor would we punish her for her motivational
deficit alone, but instead for her unjust treatment of
another person who herself was entitled to just treatment.
This is not to say that this was always so; but criminal
offenders are no longer "outlawed," stripped of their

91. This is the sense in which Hegel's essentially retributivist theory of
punishment also has a reformative aspect. See, e.g., J. Ellis McTaggart, Hegel's
Theory of Punishment, 6 INT'L J. ETHICS 479 (1896).
92. Rawls, supra note 57, at 302.
93. Id. at 305.
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or deprived entirely and permanently
citizenship, attainted,
94
of their civil rights.
The offender's manifest disrespect for justice, and
therefore for other persons, likewise doesn't deprive her of
the right to have the state restore her personhood through
the institutions of civil and criminal justice, should she ever
be the victim rather than the offender-the object rather
than the subject of a crime, or any other unjust act. From
the perspective of justice, a motivationally challenged
murderer is as entitled to receive damages for breach of
contract or tort feasance, or to have her murderer prosecuted, as anyone else. (Once again, whether actual state
practice always respects this principle of justice and
prosecutors vigorously in fact pursue crimes committed
against prison inmates, or offenders in general, is another
matter.95) In Rawls's formulation, "the duty of justice is
owed only to those who can complain of not being justly
treated, ' 96 and she most certainly can complain about
unjust treatment if she is being dealt with as anything
other than an equal and rational person, even if her
complaint will not in fact be heard or acted upon.
So far, we have noted cases in which a motivational
deficit doesn't affect a person's right to make justice claims.
We owe a duty of justice to anyone who possesses the basic
rational capacities, cognitive and volitional, that are
necessary for an effective sense of justice. But being entitled
to just treatment doesn't imply being entitled to decide
matters of justice. Someone devoid of respect for other
persons, without the desire to act justly, cannot dispose of
94. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9 (prohibition of bills of attainder); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (forfeiture of citizenship constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 31 (2d ed. 1898) (outlawry in medieval law).

Nonetheless traces of these practices remain in contemporary American law, as
is evidenced by the widespread practice of felon disenfranchisement. See
generally PATRICIA ALLARD & MARC MAUER, REGAINING THE VOTE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITY RELATING TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS (2000),

availableat http://www.sentencing project.org/pubs_05.cfm.
95. Cf. David Grann, How the Aryan Brotherhood Became the Most
Murderous Prison Gang in America, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 157, 167
(law enforcement officials describing intraprison crimes as N.H.I.s-"No
humans involved").
96. Rawls, supra note 57, at 303.

2005]

SENSE OFJUSTICE

843

matters of justice, because she is incapable of assuming the
standpoint of justice. Put another way, anyone is precluded
from determining matters of justice, or resolving justice
disputes, insofar as she cannot act according to her sense of
justice, rather than personal interest.
To take the extreme case of criminal law again, a
sociopathic offender has the right to a just disposition of her
case; she does not have the right to sit in judgment of
others. Nor does she have the right to sit in judgment of
herself. When it comes to the ability to assume the
perspective of justice, we ask much more of our judges-and
our jurors-than we do of our criminal defendants.
The defendant's right to be treated justly demands not
that she decide her case, but that she be permitted-but not
required-to participate in the process culminating in a
decision. Both the defendant and the prosecutor in a
criminal case, as well as the defendant and the plaintiff in a
civil case, must be allowed to participate in the application
of the appropriate norms to their conflict. But they need
not, and in fact may not, decide their case. For if they were
to decide their case, they could not be trusted to be
motivated by principles of justice. The temptation to be
moved by considerations of personal advantage would be
too great.97 Without the opportunity to participate in the
resolution of their dispute, the parties would be treated
merely as objects of disposition, rather than as agents
capable of self-determination: Their autonomy must be
respected even if they lack an effective sense of justice.
Deciding matters of justice, by contrast, requires not only
the capacity for autonomy, but an effective sense of justice
as well. This function is performed not by the parties to the
conflict, but by a third party, the judge, or the jury. This
third, impartial, party is the institutional manifestation of

97. This is the foundation of the age-old rule that no one may be a judge in
his own cause, as a matter of justice-which on the face of it is a direct violation
of the fundamental principle of legitimacy in the modern state, autonomy,
rather than its vindication. In fact, it's not a primary principle of justice, but an
enabling principle of prudence which makes justice possible given the
background realities of human nature in a not-so-well-ordered society. See, e.g.,
1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 94, at 410 (judgment of peers, rather than
king, in treason cases "based on the maxim that no one should be judge in his
own cause").
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the standpoint of justice in the face of likely selfinterestedness, or partiality, among the parties to the
conflict.
But given the unlikelihood of actual, rather than potential, moral self-judgment-most dramatically illustrated by
the refusal of guilty offenders to confess-how can the
autonomy of the parties be respected nonetheless, and the
legitimacy of the process ensured? In two ways, one direct,
the other indirect: (1) directly (but not dispositively),
through the parties' right to participatein the process, and
(2) indirectly (and dispositively), through the resolution of
the conflict by a third party in a process of judgment that
reflects both parties' autonomy through roletaking from the
perspective of justice, i.e., through exercising her sense of
justice. The jury decides as the parties would decide, had
they assumed the standpoint of justice.
Ideally, of course, the parties would resolve their dispute in fact through settlement, considering what is just.
The objection to this disposition is not principled, but once
again prudential. The question is whether the parties are so
situated with respect to each other that we can be confident
that their negotiations will take the form of a justice discourse among equal persons, rather than simply reflecting
their power differential, in which case the stronger party
may very well trample the autonomy of the weaker.98 The
most extreme case here is, once again, presented by the
criminal law, where the power differential between the
state and the accused is notoriously steep: Plea bargaining,
the process by which over 90% of criminal cases are
resolved, is not objectionable in principle (on the contrary, it
is preferable as an unmediatedly autonomous process), but
as a matter of prudence given the radically unequal
bargaining positions of prosecutors and defendants. 99

98. This concern, arguably, underlay the maximum hours law struck down
in the famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and accounts for
much of modern labor law, a curious mixture of direct and indirect
empowerment.
99. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges,
and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1997); see also
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909 (1992) (proposing reforms to level the playing field).
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Now in the case of the definition-rather than the
application-of the principles of justice themselves, or other
subsidiary norms in keeping with these principles, the same
distinction can be drawn. While anyone with the rational
capacity for moral personhood must be permitted to
participate in the discourse about the definition of norms,
only those persons who are actually motivated by their
sense of justice are entitled to decide what the norm should
look like, i.e., to lay down the law, to legislate, in the true
sense of the word.
This, I think, is the limited meaning of Kant's otherwise
cryptic remark that the criminal may not make criminal
law. 100 Insofar, but only insofar, as she is self-interested,
the criminal cannot take the standpoint of justice. If,
however, she chooses to exercise her capacity for a sense of
justice, and to respect other persons as such, she is entitled
not only to participate in the debate about the definition of
norms, but to define the norms herself, even if she has been
labeled a "criminal" on the basis of past conduct.
Here too the distinction between participation and
decision finds an institutional manifestation, this time in
the distinctions between elected representatives and the
electorate, and between the rights to be voted for and to
vote (or the passive and active franchise). The body of
representatives itself is charged with deciding issues from
the standpoint of justice, a constraint that doesn't apply to
their constituents, who nonetheless are permitted to
participate in the debate, including by casting their vote.
The act of voting does not require taking the standpoint of
justice. Voters regularly do, and are expected to, manifest
merely their personal self-interest.
This is not true of the persons they vote for. These
representatives decide definitional matters of justice in
general as their constituents would, from the standpoint of
justice, i.e., by imaginatively exercising their sense of
justice, much like jurors decide applicatory questions of
justice in particular cases. The distinction between participation and decision also is illustrated by the practice of
lobbying, whose practitioners are entitled to introduce
arguments into public debate which, if considered from the
100. KANT, METAPHYSIK, supra note 37, at 457 (A203-04/B232).
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proper standpoint of justice, may win the day, despite the
obviously, and explicitly, self-serving motivation for their
indirect introduction into the justice discourse by persons
without the authority to bring it to a resolution.
And here too we find the legitimacy of the process, in
this case of defining rather than applying norms, derive
itself from both direct participation and indirect, vicarious,
their
re-present
The representatives
self-judgment.
constituents, they decide as if they were their constituents,
through empathy from the standpoint of justice; the
representatives decide as the represented would decide if
they were to exercise their capacity for a sense of justice,
rather than to pursue their personal advantage.
To put it yet another way, only the capacity for moral
personhood is required to make a justice claim, to "complain
of not being justly treated," i.e., to demand justice. But the
actual exercise of that capacity is required to dispose of
such a claim, i.e., to do justice. To do justice and to take the
standpoint of justice are two ways of expressing the same
idea.
Rawls developed the construct of the original position to
capture what it means to take the standpoint of justice.
Persons in the original position, in deliberating about the
principles of justice, abstract from all characteristics of
their fellow deliberators that are irrelevant from the
standpoint of justice. In that way, they regard each other as
moral persons. Insofar as we imagine ourselves in the
original position, which is an imaginative thought experiment we can undertake at any time, we are acting on our
sense of justice. That doesn't mean that we disregard our
self-interest. It simply means that we regard our selfinterest as the interest of someone who is nothing more
than a moral agent, and in that sense is equal to all other
participants in the discourse. In Rawls's words, the point of
the veil of ignorance-i.e., the abstraction from morally
"to represent equality
irrelevant characteristics-is
between human beings as moral persons, as creatures
having a conception of their good and capable of a sense of
justice."' 0 '

101. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 19.
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In Rawls's scheme, thinking about justice thus requires
two kinds of imaginative roletaking. First, we must imagine
ourselves in the original position. Second, when in the
original position, we must imagine ourselves in the shoes of
everyone who might be affected by the justice decisions we
make, and the choice of principles of justice in particular.
The same holds, analogously, for our assumption of the
standpoint of justice to imaginatively deliberate on lowerorder norms under the conditions of a modified original
position, in which the veil of ignorance is partially lifted to
reveal to us facts about our particular political community,
as for example in constitutional or legislative deliberations.
But since we take the standpoint of justice, this empathic
roletaking considers objects of identification not only as
having certain interests, but also as being objects of justice,
i.e., as persons who can make justice claims.
Understood as a particular, moral, form of empathic
roletaking, the sense of justice thus plays a central role in
Rawls's theory of justice, and not merely as a guarantor of
the stability of a well-ordered society. It plays a similar role
in Habermas's discourse theory. As Thomas McCarthy has
stressed, the discourse participants are conceptualized as
"moral agents" who are "trying to put themselves in each
other's shoes.' 10 2 And again, "Habermas's discourse model,
by requiring that perspective-taking be general and
reciprocal, builds the moment of empathy into the
procedure of coming to a reasoned agreement: each must
put him- or herself into the place of everyone else in
discussing whether a proposed norm is fair to all." 10 3 Both
Habermas and Rawls rely on the sense of justice. They
differ on the nature of the moral deliberation, or discourse,
that depends on it. Rawls is content with an individual's
thought experiment (the original position and its
variations), whereas Habermas requires actual public
discourse.
Rawls began by constructing an abstract account of the
moral point of view, the original position, including an

102. Thomas

McCarthy,

Introduction to

JORGEN

HABERMAS,

MORAL

viii (Christian Lenhardt &
Shierry Weber Nicholsen, trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983).
103. Id. at viii-ix.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION vii,
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account of the persons who take that point of view. From
that construction, he tried to derive a set of principles of
justice, as one possible, rational, outcome of deliberations in
the original position, given its constraints.
Habermas starts not far from Rawls, and then doesn't
go quite as far. Instead of constructing the original position,
a thought experiment designed "simply to make vivid to
ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to
impose on arguments for principles of justice,"10 4 Habermas
constructs an ideal speech situation that, based on an
analysis of actual communicative behavior, captures the
presuppositions of actual public discourse, including discourse about what is just. In the words of his fellow critical
theorist
Hans-Otto
Apel,
Habermas's
"universal
pragmatics" is about determining "what we must necessarily always already presuppose in regard to ourselves and
others as normative conditions of the possibility of
understanding; and in this sense, what we must necessarily
always already have accepted."'105 These presuppositions in
turn generate certain norms of deliberative conduct that, if
followed, add up to what Habermas calls the ideal speech
situation. An agreement is legitimate insofar as the
conditions under which it was reached match the conditions
of the construct of the ideal speech situation. The ideal
speech situation, in other words, embodies all those "rules
and communicative presuppositions that make it possible to
distinguish an accord or agreement among
free and equals
from a contingent or forced consensus."10 6
The ideal speech situation thus serves a function
analogous to that of the original position in Rawls's theory.
But unlike Rawls, Habermas is content with constructing
the abstract conditions of legitimacy. He does not move on
to develop a particular theory of justice, i.e., a set of
principles of justice that might result from deliberation
under these conditions.
This is an important difference between Habermas's
and Rawls's work. But it's not of particular interest for our

104. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 18.
105. HABERMAS, supra note 62, at 2.
106. HABERMAS, supra note 59, at 188.
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purposes. What matters to us is the similarity between
Habermas's and Rawls's approach, and one point of
similarity in particular, namely their recognition of the
significance of a sense of justice in modern political theory.
That similarity emerges most clearly when we focus on
their common interest in the concept of fundamental
communicative (Habermas) or moral (Rawls) competence,
and in particular in their shared interest in the work of
Piaget and Kohlberg, on the one hand, and of Noam
Chomsky, on the other.
III. THE SENSE OF JUSTICE AND THE SENSE OF LANGUAGE

In their search for what we must presuppose about a
person participating in justice deliberation (moral
personhood for Rawls, communicative competence for
Habermas) both ended up with the notion of the sense of
justice as a bundle of human capacities that are developed
over time, through the experience of social life in ever
widening communities. Rawls and Habermas both view
their task as analyzing the sense of justice, which both take
to be a basic human capacity. Both assume that we already
know what it means to take the moral point of view or to
engage in the discourse constitutive of interpersonal
relations. It's simply a matter of bringing these presuppositions to light.
Habermas seeks to expose that "intuitive knowledge"
which lets us engage in interpersonal dialogue.
"Ascertaining the so-called intuitions of a speaker," ' he
10 7
explains, "is already the beginning of their explication."
This communicative competence presupposes certain
cognitive skills that make it possible to recognize and to
comply with rules. But as an interactive, or interpersonal,
competence it also requires the ability to distinguish
between self and other, and eventually to place oneself in
the shoes of other participants in the interaction. This
empathic component also explains the connection between
interactive competence and moral consciousness, which-as
Rousseau already pointed out-requires the very same
capacity for imaginative roletaking. As Habermas puts it,

107. HABERMAS, supra note 62, at 19.
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drawing on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, "[t]he
correlation between levels of interactive competence and
stages of moral consciousness ... means that someone who
possesses interactive competence at a particular' 10stage
will
develop a moral consciousness at the same stage. 8
In other words, the sense of language and the sense of
justice overlap. They involve the same fundamental
capacities. To understand one therefore is to understand
(much about) the other. Rawls makes this connection
between the two senses, or competences, even more explicit
than does Habermas: "It is plausible to suppose that any
being capable of language is capable of the intellectual
performances required to have a sense of justice."10 9 What's
more, Rawls sees the task of political and moral theory as
analogous to that of linguistic theory. While the former
seeks to "describ[e] our sense of justice," 110 the latter
'
attempts to describe "the sense of grammaticalness."111
The precise relationship between the sense of justice
and of language depends on one's account of each sense.
Piaget and Kohlberg argued that the senses of justice and of
language resemble all other cognitive skills in that they are
socially determined except for an innate capacity, a sort of
general intelligence. On this account, the intellectual
capacity underlying the sense of justice and the sense of
language would coincide. By contrast, Chomsky postulated
the existence of an innate and exclusive language "organ"
equipped with quite detailed instructions for the speedy
generation of common language grammars. In Chomsky's
theory, the capacity for the sense of justice presumably
would differ from the capacity for a sense of language as the
latter capacity is unique. 112

108. HABERMAS, supra note 61, at 91.

109. Rawls, supra note 57, at 302.
110. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 46.
111. Id. at 47.
112. On the debate, see LANGUAGE AND LEARNING: THE DEBATE BETWEEN
JEAN PIAGET AND NOAM CHOMSKY (Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini ed., 1980).
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Rawls and Habermas both rely on Piaget and Kohlberg,
as well as on Chomsky. 113 They adopt Piaget and Kohlberg's
account of the development of cognitive and moral
competence-the sense of justice. Yet they clearly view
themselves as pursuing Chomsky's project of mapping the
"linguistic intuition of the native speaker" 1 4-the sense of
language--in the moral and political sphere. 115 As the
project of Chomsky's universal linguistics is to "reconstruct
the rule consciousness common to all competent speakers,"
so Habermas's universal pragmatics analyzes "a universal
capability, a general cognitive, linguistic, or interactive
competence."1 1 6 Just as Rawls tries to "characterize one
(educated) person's sense of justice" 117 in a well-ordered
society and Habermas explores the interactive competence
presupposed in discourse within an ideal speech situation,
so Chomsky is interested in the linguistic competence of
"the ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous
speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying
18
his knowledge of the language in actual performance."'
The resolution of the debate between Piaget/Kohlberg
and Chomsky about the nature of the sense of language is
of secondary importance for our purposes. What matters is
that, as Habermas remarks, both theories attempt "to
reconstruct the universal linguistic ability of adult

113. This feature of Rawls's work, and the connections between moral
theory and linguistics in general, only recently have begun to attract attention.
See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN, Moral Philosophy and Linguistics, in EXPLAINING
VALUE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2000); John Mikhail, Rawls'
Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the "Generative Grammar" Model of Moral
Theory (Cornell University Ph.D. diss. 2000); Susan Dwyer, Moral Competence,
in PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTICS 169-70 (K. Murasugi & R. Stainton eds., 1999).
114. NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX § 4 (1965); see also

Hans-Martin Gauger & Wulf Oesterreicher, Sprachgefuhl und Sprachsinn, in
SPRACHGEFUHL: VIER ANTWORTEN AUF EINE PREISFRAGE 9, 29 (Deutsche
Akademie ed., 1982).
115. RAWLS, supra note 60, at 47.
116. HABERMAS, supra note 62, at 14.

117. RAWLS, supranote 60, at 50.
118. CHOMSKY, supra note 114, § 4.
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speakers. (In a strong version, this linguistic competence
means the ability to develop hypotheses that guide
language acquisition on the basis of an innate disposition;
in a weaker version, linguistic competence represents the
result of learning processes interpreted constructivistically
in Piaget's sense.)" 119 And it is this general project that
marks the point of convergence between moral, political,
and linguistic theory, and the study of the sense of justice
and that of language.
Now the concept of a sense of language, or "what the
120 has been subject to many of
Germans call Sprachgefiihl,"'
the same misinterpretations as that of a sense of justice (or
what the Germans call Rechtsgefiihl). Both concepts
received the greatest attention in Germany, and there
underwent similar transmogrifications. Both concepts
emerged from the rich soil of German Romanticism, at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. And both were bound
up with the Romantics' rediscovery of German nationalism.
The aggressively irrational National Socialist notion of the
healthy sentiments of the German Volk resonated with
early nineteenth century talk of a communal German sense
of justice. 121 Likewise, the sense of language was conceived
of as a communal attribute, a defining characteristic of the
German Volk. According to the great Romantic linguist
(and collector of German fairy tales), Jacob Grimm, a Volk
was but a community of people who speak the same
language and share the same sense of language. 22 Just as
the sense of justice, the sense of language could be found in
its pure form among the simple folk. German lay jurors
were said to have immediate access to truth and justice,
unobstructed by juridical learning derived from the
traditional study of Roman law texts. 23 Likewise, Grimm

119. HABERMAS, supra note 62, at 32.

120. EMMON BACH, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR 3-4
(1964) ("What we must account for [in linguistics] includes what is known as
the native speaker's 'intuition' about what he says and hears, what the
Germans call Sprachgefuhl.").
121. See Dubber, supra note 7, at 229.
122. 16 GRIMMSCHES WORTERBUCH

Jacob Grimm).
123. See Dubber, supra note 7.

2758 (entry "Sprachgrenze") (quoting
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admired (German) women for "their healthy maternal wit
Mutterwitz)" and "their unspoiled sense of
(gesunder 24
language."1
At the same time, however, and again in analogy to the
sense of justice, the sense of language also was perceived as
the special skill of the expert, rather than the instinctive
sense of correctness shared by all native speakers. As the
experienced jurist developed a sensus iuridicus, a feel for
the correct solution of a juridical problem, so the expert
linguist had a sense for proper grammar. It was the sense of
language thus understood that the early Romantic
Dictionalrian Joachim Heinrich Campe invoked when he
declared that he distinguished between correct and
incorrect language usage on the basis of his sense of
language, which he shared with all other professional
writers. 125 Similarly, the sense of language was also a sense
for language, a feeling for the appropriate expression, the
proper turn of phrase, a skill that could be acquired and
perfected. 126
But as in the tradition of the sense of justice, so also in
that of the sense of language, among the heap of communal
and elitist misconceptions that today retain at best
historical-or perhaps aesthetic-interest, but have no
place in a theory of the modern democratic state, there is
the beginning of a project that is worth continuing. And
once again it is enlightenment thought that produced an
account that looks as fresh today as it did two centuries
ago. In the case of the sense of justice, this foundation was
laid, as we saw earlier, by the Scottish moral sense
thinkers, along with Kant and Hegel. In the case of the
sense of language, that honor goes to Wilhelm von
Humboldt.
It was Humboldt who first postulated the sense of
language as a universal human linguistic competence, in
particular the capacity of generative grammar, which
accounts for the otherwise inexplicable phenomenon of the
124. See GRIMMSCHES WORTERBUCH, supra note 122, at 2753.
125. JOACHIM HEINRICH CAMPE, Preface to WORTERBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN
SPRACHE xvi (Braunschweig 1810).
126. E.g., 3 MORIZ HEYNE, DEUTSCHES WORTERBUCH (Leipzig: S. Hirzel 1906)

(entry "Sprachgefifhl").
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acquisition of basic grammatical competence within a short
span of time and without extensive environmental guidance
or actual language training. 127 (Humboldt may well have
picked up the concept of a sense of language from Campe,
who was his private tutor as a child, and with
whom he
128
apparently stayed in touch throughout his life. )
Chomsky has always acknowledged his debt to
Humboldt. 129 Humboldt's conception of the sense of
language as a basic competence mirrors Kant's view of the
sense of justice as the capacity for moral empathy. As
Chomsky explains, Humboldt saw that it's because of "the
virtual identity of this underlying system in speaker and
hearer that communication can take place, the sharing of
an underlying
generative system being traceable,
ultimately, to the uniformity of human nature."130 So
language is possible because we share a sense of language;
and justice is possible because we share a sense of justice.
For Piaget-and Kohlberg, Rawls, and Habermas after
him-the sense of language and the sense of justice develop
as the child learns to integrate herself into the social world
around her. Both arise "through the progress made by
cooperation and mutual respect-cooperation between
children to begin with, and then between child and adult as
the child approaches adolescence and comes, secretly at
least, to consider himself as the adult's equal."' 3 ' As the
child learns to navigate an ever wider social world, and to
negotiate relationships with ever more-and more remote-

127. See WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, ON LANGUAGE: ON THE DIVERSITY OF
HUMAN LANGUAGE CONSTRUCTION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE MENTAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN SPECIES (Michael Losonsky ed., Peter Heath

trans., 1999) (1836).
128. See Gauger & Oesterreicher, supra note 114, at 13.
129. CHOMSKY, supra note 114.

130. T.C. WILLIAMS, KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: CHOMSKYAN
LINGUISTICS AND ITS KANTIAN ROOTS 12 (1993) (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY,
CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS 70-71 (1966)).
131. See JEAN PIAGET, Moral Judgment: Children Invent the Social Contract
(1932), in THE ESSENTIAL PIAGET 159, 190 (Howard E. Gruber & J. Jacques

Von~che, eds. 1977).
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both interactive competence and
persons, she develops
132
moral consciousness.
In other words, the rational skills-the conceptual
competence-required to communicate and to get along
with others are identical. These include the fundamental
cognitive ability to recognize norms (of language or of
justice) and to apply them to particular cases. Moreover,
they include the volitional ability to act according to the
norms, once recognized and applied. Cognitive competence,
in other words, is not enough. In linguistic terms,
communication breaks down if the speaker commits
grammatical errors, even though she is in fact familiar with
the rules of grammar and, in theory, knows how to apply
them.
In addition to these basic, monologic, rational
capacities, an effective sense of language and of justice, as
varieties of interactive competence, require certain dialogic
capacities. They require the psychological ability to
distinguish between self and other. Without that distinction, interpersonal interaction is impossible. At the same
time, the recognition of interpersonal difference must be
mediated by the ability to recognize identities in the face of
difference. Without the recognition of identities, there will
be no interpersonal interaction, no social integration. That
integration, moreover, requires the imaginative capacity to
transform recognized identity into identification. By placing
myself in the shoes of another, by identifying with her, I
can interact with her, talk with her, rather than at her.
Here the sense of language reveals itself as a
precondition of interactive competence. The sense of justice
is one aspect of that discursive competence, one that comes
into play when the point of the discourse is justice. But the
ability to empathize, in the formal sense of imaginative
roletaking, is presupposed in communication of any kind, as
becomes clear once we follow Habermas and consider
discourse in general, rather than justice deliberation in
particular (as Rawls did).
The sense of justice differs from general communicative
competence, and therefore the sense of language, in one

132. HABERMAS, supra note 61, at 69, 91.
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crucial respect. The rules involved are rules of justice,
rather than merely rules of grammar, or more generally of
communication. As a result, the sense of justice
presupposes the abstraction from certain characteristics of
its object. That abstraction in turn presupposes the capacity
to do so and, for the sense of justice to be effective, the
willingness to do so and to act accordingly. Acting on one's
sense of justice means identifying with another as a moral
person, rather than as the member of some particular
community. Dialogue among family members, for instance,
is certainly possible, but it's not a dialogue about justice
unless all participants assume the standpoint of justice and
treat one another as equal rational persons, rather than as
family members. The notion of a justice dialect, specific to a
particular community defined by relation or region, is selfcontradictory. In this regard, the sense of justice is more
substantive than is the sense of language. It is does not
merely presuppose the ability to identify and comply with
some rules of justice, but with rules of justice that are
consistent with one's perception of others as persons. The
sense of justice thus differs from a broader ethical, or
normative, sense, which would be more closely analogous to
a sense of language as it would not privilege one type of
norm over another.
The sense of justice, in other words, is a moral
sentiment, rather than merely a universal competence.
Unlike the sense of language, it requires an act of reflection, through which another person is conceptualized as a
fellow moral person. And that recognition of fellow moral
personhood then gives rise to respect and, assuming an
effective sense of justice, the desire to treat its object justly.
To recognize another as a fellow moral person, however,
is to recognize another as possessed of the capacity for
autonomy. As Kant realized, it's that recognition of another
as equally capable of self-government which gives rise to
the sense of justice as a moral sentiment. The capacity for
autonomy now presupposes the same conceptual capacities
as do the sense of justice and the sense of language. The
capacity for autonomy, too, presumes the cognitive capacity
to recognize and apply norms, as well as the volitional
capacity to adhere to them. And yet, the capacity for
autonomy differs from the sense of justice and the sense of
language in one important respect: it presumes the capacity
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to generate norms, and not merely to understand and to
follow them. The moral person has the ability to create
norms and govern herself through them. Put another way,
autonomy is not merely government by norms (which would
be consistent with other-government, or heteronomy), but
self-government by norms (or auto-nomy).
In sum, the sense of justice is motivated by the mutual
recognition among persons of this capacity to govern oneself
by generating, understanding, and following norms. The
principles of justice are the principles that govern the
interaction among moral persons who recognized one
another as such. Through empathic mutual roletaking,
these principles of justice coincide with the norms by which
the moral person governs herself. This is the meaning of the
coincidence of the reasonable and the rational in Rawls, and
of the principle of universalizability in Kant.
Through mutual roletaking the distinction between
respect for others and respect for oneself collapses along
with the distinction between other and self. The sense of
justice is the other-regarding aspect of the capacity for
autonomy; the sense of justice exposes the social component
of the fundamental moral capacity, which otherwise might
be misunderstood as entirely self-regarding, and thus
amoral. It is this function of the sense of justice, its quality
as a social sense, that is highlighted by exposing its
connection to the sense of language, or communicative
competence. Without empathic roletaking, neither Kant's
kingdom of ends, nor Rawls's original position, nor
Habermas's ideal speech community would have any moral
significance. Without the sense of justice, autonomy would
be the amoral characteristic of hermits.
CONCLUSION

As a formal capacity shared by all persons as such, the
sense of justice is the prerequisite for judicial decisionmaking as well as for jury deliberation, for legislative action
as well as for police behavior. It does not decide cases, or
determine action; it sets the framework within which
justice is possible. And as a universal capacity, it is what
connects all members of a community of justice, across
official and unofficial roles. At bottom, it's the ability and
willingness to recognize others as equal and rational
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persons and treat them as such, by placing oneself in their
shoes and experiencing things from their point of view, even
if that point of view is substantively-and substantiallydifferent from our own.
Understood in this way, the sense of justice is a
necessary condition for the existence and stability of a
political community governed by law. Legal institutions
spring from our ability and willingness to experience the
concerns of others as our own, not because they are
members of our family, our race, our sports club, or even
our nation, but because they are persons and therefore
entitled to justice. Put another way, the sense of justice
makes solidarity possible in a modern pluralistic society.
Finally, as Rawls has stressed, a legal system will
remain stable only if we see it as doing justice, so that we
can expect to be treated justly as well, should we become
the object of state action for one reason or another. We must
regard the system as operating on the same assumption of
reciprocal respect among equals. In that way, but only in
that way, must we see ourselves reflected in the state's
institutions. Even if we do not share the particular
principles of justice animating the actions of state officials,
we will be inclined to act according to our sense of justice as
long as the state treats us as persons equipped with the
formal capacity to develop, experience, and follow a sense of
justice.

